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PREFACE 
During the  past few years there  has been a growing international con- 
cern about environmental and socio-economic impacts and conflicts associ- 
ated with the  use of transboundary water resources in general, and also 
with the use of international r ivers  in particular. The Decision Support  
Systems for Managing Large Internationai Rivers  Project (LIR) was 
launched at IIASA to address at least some of the crucial issues regarding 
the management of large international rivers. The project aims to provide 
methodological and technical assistance t o w a r d s  collaborative efforts of 
countries, r iver  basin commissions and international agencies. Its scope is  
vast involving research in many fields, including political sciences. 
The author presents an extensive and interesting analysis of problems 
of the  Danube, which is  one of the  t w o  case studies being dealt with in LIR. 
The other  case study is  the  Zambezi River in Africa. The approach is  
r a the r  unfamiliar to professionals of physical and technological problems in 
- iii - 
shared r i v e r  basins. I t  does not mean tha t  this  work is not f o r  such profes- 
sionals, on the  contrary,  f o r  t he  facts and mechanisms described by Lin- 
nerooth should r a t h e r  help in establishing cooperation in improving the  
water quality of t he  Danube. W e  hope tha t  this  work will lead to construc- 
tive discussions tha t  are necessary not only in t h e  case of t he  Danube to 
establish mechanisms and organisations t o  improve and harmonize t h e  utili- 
zation of water resources in shared r i v e r  basins. 
K.A. Salewicz 
Project  Leader 
NEGOTIATED RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT 
Implementing the Danube Declaration 
Joanne Linnerooth * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the recent catastrophic 
poisoning of the Rhine river stunned the European public with an awareness of its vulner- 
ability to the risks of even distant technologies. Technological accidents, along with such 
problems as acid rain, ozone depletion, and even soil pollution, are increasingly of interna- 
tional concern. Yet, international procedures and institutions for coping with transboun- 
dary environmental problems are only just beginning to  evolve. Current arrangements 
and mechanisms for transboundary environmental dispute resolution and cooperation will 
need substantial improvement if the environmental challenges of the next decades are t o  
be met. 
In many respects, the management of surface water has been a forerunner in interna- 
tional cooperation on a shared resource. This unique history of cooperation, however, has 
concerned mainly the economic development of water resources; the problems of water 
quality and ecological degradation have generally not enjoyed the same status.  There are 
discouragingly few multinational working arrangements for preventing water pollution. 
The Rhine river disaster, for which no river in the world can claim immunity, has drama- 
tized the urgency of multinational efforts t o  prevent the further degradation of valuable 
water resources. 
* This paper was supported by a grant from the Carnegie Foundation to the IIASA project on the Processes 
of International Negotiations (PIN). I am grateful for the helpful comments and assistance I received from 
W.C. Clark, Acad. Z. Kaczmarek, G.  Kovacs, D.P. Loucks, L. Mermet and E. Weber. I take, however, full 
responsibility for all views expressed in this paper. 
This paper is concerned with the management of one of the most international rivers 
in the world --- the Danube. Recently, representatives from eight European countries 
bordering the Danube have declared their willingness to cooperate on its management, 
especially in confronting the mounting problems of water pollution. In signing this non- 
binding Danube Declaration (1985), the riparian countries have moved slowly, but 
squarely, into what White (1977) has called the integrated approach to river manage- 
ment. Accordingly, greater attention is paid to making informed tradeoffs on the 
conflicting uses of a river and particularly to the interrelationships between its biological 
and physical properties and other environmental systems. 
Understanding the tradeoffs involved in setting priorities on the conflicting uses of 
the Danube presents a challenge to the scientific disciplines traditionally engaged in water 
research. An equally difficult challenge, as the history of over 200 international river 
basins shows, lies in establishing cooperation between sovereign states in the management 
of a shared water resource. This challenge can be appreciated by considering that the 
implementation of the Danube Declaration requires cooperation: 
among eight countries spanning Eastern and Western Europe; 
in the absence of effective and enforceable international legal rules; 
in the absence of a basin-wide planning or decision authority for the integrated 
management of the river; 
between numerous national and international authorities with diverse, conflicting 
interests; 
on problems for which the geopolitics of the "upstream" and "downstream" countries 
creates disincentives for cooperative behavior; 
on issues characterized by serious scientific gaps and uncertainties; and 
in an atmosphere of increasing concern about the long-term effects of toxic pollu- 
tants and an acute awareness that pollutants cross national boundaries. 
An underlying theme of negotiation research is that significant improvements in 
cooperative problem solving and negotiated policy making are possible. These improve- 
ments are crucial for coping with worsening transboundary environmental problems. This 
paper describes the water quality issue on the Danube as, foremost, a problem of nego- 
tiated settlements, and explores the potential of the analyst in this process. 
After briefly describing the geography of the Danube river and the nature of the 
conflicts involved in its management, I turn in Sections I11 and IV to the issue of water 
pollution. The scientific gaps in understanding the pathways and effects of toxic water 
pollutants and the "upstream-downstream'' geopolitics of cooperative regulation combine 
to make this issue especially difficult from the perspective of negotiated policies. In Sec- 
tion V,  I examine the intricacies of the negotiating process, which in the absence of a 
Danube river basin authority will involve mostly bilateral agreements with all the accom- 
panying intrastate and inter-organization hurdles in reaching internal consensus. These 
internal negotiations have the potential of becoming even more difficult as the Danube 
pollution issue is escalated onto the public agenda as part of rising ~ u b l i c  concern over 
accidental and chronic water pollution, which may be aggravated by the continuing 
exploi~a~iorl ol Danube waler power. Irl secliorl VI, I lurrl lo lhe polerllial role ol   he 
analyst in supporting negotiations on the shared use of water resources by furthering 
mutual learning and joint problem solving. 
11. THE DANUBE RIVER 
Flowing over 2,850 km. from the Black Forest in the Federal Republic of Germany 
to the Black Sea in Romania and the USSR, the Danube is Europe's second largest river 
(see Figure 1). It is also one of the world's most international rivers with eight riparian 
countries, including the FRG, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union, and it transfers water from the non-riparian countries of 

Albania, Italy, Switzerland and Poland. Near i ts  source, the Danube has the character of 
a mountain river flowing through the FRG and Austria (passing Regensburg and Vienna) 
into Czechoslovakia, where a t  Bratislava it forms the border between Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Flowing south through the Great  Hungarian Plain (passing Budapest),  i t  turns 
eastward into Yugoslavia (passing Belgrad) and later forms the border between Yugosla- 
via and Romania with the famous narrows a t  the Iron Gate.  The  lower, marshy section 
of the river serves again as a geographic boundary on the long stretch between Romania 
and Bulgaria, where shortly before the Black Sea i t  separates Romania and the Soviet 
Union, and empties into a spectacular delta. Over 300 tributaries flow into the Danube. 
The  geographic variety of the Danube is matched by the cultural, economic, and pol- 
itical diversity of the countries through which it flows. Connecting Eastern and Western 
Europe, i ts joint management symbolizes the  potential for cooperation between diverse 
political and economic cultures. Table I shows the different economic and Danube-related 
allignments of the eight riparian countries. In addition, two U.N. organizations, the 
Economic Commission of Europe and the World Health Organization, have been active in 
matters  related t o  the Danube. 
FRG X X 
Austria X X 
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Diverse, conflicting uses of a large river 
Possibly no other natural  resource has so  many uses as a river. T o  provide for this 
diversity, the management of this resource must assure, t o  varying degrees, the  following 
fundamental interests: 
r Maintaining the river flow 
(for electric power generation and for the disposal of industrial 
and urban wastes) 
Maintaining and expanding the navigable waterways 
(for navigation) 
Assuring an  adequate supply of water 
(for irrigation, industrial cooling processes, and all other uses) 
r Protecting the  water quality 
(for potable water,  irrigation, fishing, recreation, tourism, 
and nature preservation) 
Preventing floods 
(for all uses) 
r Preserving the river and i ts  surroundings 
(for recreation, tourism, and nature preservation) 
Any management strategy will involve tradeoffs. The  most difficult involve the uses of a 
river for such purposes as electric power generation, navigation, and waste disposal and 
those uses requiring a n  acceptable quality of water,  e.g., potable water,  irrigation, 
fisheries, tourism, etc. In addition, irrigation requires enormous quantities of water and 
may seriously reduce the supply of water for other purposes. 
Historically, international river disputes have involved mainly conflicts over water 
apportionment, e.g., diverting the water for industrial and agricultural uses by the 
upstream countries and depriving those downstream of adequate supplies. T h e  financing 
and control of flood prevention projects, with both advantages and disadvantages for 
downstream riparians, has been another contentious area, bu t  also a n  issue tha t  has 
presented opportunities for the cooperative management of rivers. Cooperation has been 
established in many river basins t o  promote large and multipurpose development projects, 
to  increase the supply of water,  prevent wide-scale flooding, produce electric energy and 
improve navigation. This  cooperation on river development projects, however, has  gen- 
erally not evolved into mutual propama for combatting water pollution and m u r i n g  the 
environmental quality of the river basin. This conflict between the large-scale develop 
ment of a river and its surroundings (with accompanying pollution problem) and the pro- 
tection of the water quality and the environment is increasingly the basis of international 
disputes. 1 
Issues of water apportionment and flood control have not shaken the Danube coun- 
tries to the extent that  they have characterized the political development of many other 
river basins. The water supply of the Danube is not significantly exploited for agricul- 
tural purposes. Although a great deal of water is used for industrial purposes,2 much of 
this water is released back into the water supply and, therefore, only the quality of the 
water is affected and not the supply. Flood control has mostly occupied national govern- 
ments, with a few important exceptions, e.g. on the Tisza river (Hungary and the  USSR) 
and the Prut  river (Romania and USSR) .3 
Major Danube issues and conflicts 
The principle Danube issues that  have provided a foundation for negotiated treaty 
making and institution building have concerned navigation and electric power generation. 
The geography of the Danube has presented arduous obstacles to navigation, including 
large shallow stretches, hazardous rapids, severe ice in the winter and heavy floods after 
the spring thaws. The long-standing Danube Commission has been instrumental in 
remedying most of these obstacles and has served as a forum for negotiating disputes 
mainly concerning the financing of the necessary investments. 
' ~ e c a u s e  of the huge areas affected and the sheer scale of some proposed developments, the long-distance, 
inter-basin transfer0 of water have evoked particular concern over the nature and scope of environmental 
changes. For instances, intense scientific and public debates have arisen over such proposals as shunting wa- 
ter from the Alaskan rivers through Canada and into the western United States, or the (abandoned) Soviet 
project for turning the Siberian rivers southward into Central Asia (Teclaff, 1978). 
2 ~ n  the U.S., e.g., industry accounts for over 40 percent of overall water consumption (Biswas, 1983). 
3 ~ l o o d  control is potentially an area of international dispute on the Danube since the past and current tren.! 
in building levies as opposed to flood plains increases the intensity of the flooding in downstrealn countriec 
(Wood, 1975). 
Despite substantial investments for assuring its navigability, the Danube is still not 
a major waterway in comparison with other European rivers.' The international impor- 
tance of the Danube, however, may radically change with the completion of the Rhine- 
Maine-Danube canal which, by connecting the Atlantic Ocean with the Black Sea, will 
allow ships to cross Eastern and Western Europe. This canal is the final link of a long- 
standing plan to create an interconnected system of inland waterways in ~ u r o ~ e . ~  Its cri- 
tics have protested its possible negative effects on Danube water quality resulting from 
the increased chances of accidental spills of hazardous substances due to  the expanding 
traffic on the river (Benedek, et. al., 1978). 
The mountainous character of the Danube in its upper reaches and the large number 
of tributaries further downstream combine to make the energy potential of the river 
significant. This potential has largely, though not fully, been exploited. There are 49 
planned or existing hydropower stations on the Danube, 40 of which are located in the 
FRG and Austria. These 40 power stations are matched in energy output by the two 
enormous Iron Gate stations between Yugoslavia and Romania (Benedek and Laszlo, 
1980). 
The huge Iron Gate project is one of several examples of collaboration between two 
riparian countries in developing the joint water resource. Another collaborative project is 
underway for improving the navigable channel along the shallow stretch between 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and for the construction of two hydropower stations a t  
Gabcikovo and Nagymaros. A third country, Austria, may contribute substantially to 
4 ~ r o u n d  60 million tons of materials are transported annually on the Danube and its tributaries, compared, 
for example, with around 700 million tons transported on West European waterways (Linnerooth, 1985). 
The Yugoslavs transport the most goods on the Danube and its tributaries (-22 million tonsfyear) followed 
by the Soviets (-15 million tonsfyear), and the rest of the countries (-26 million tonsfyear). 
5 ~ t s  full cost (around 1 billion dollars) will be financed fully hy the federal government of the FRG and the 
state government of Bavaria. This cost, it is estimated, will be recovered by the planned hydrostations on 
the canal and the use of water for irrigation, industrial and recreational purposes, and including the in- 
creased opportunities for German shipping. The Economic Commission of Europe has estimated that by the 
end of the 1980's, the traffic on the canal between Ni~rnhurg nnd Regennbnrg will be approximately 1 4  mil- 
lion tons per year. (Rhein-Main-Donau Aktiengeselschaft Miinchen, Baubericht 1974, 8000 Miinchen 40, 
Leopoldstrasse 28, April 1975.) 
financing the projects in return for imported electricity once the projects are completed. 
The Cabcikovo-Nagymaros project, along with an abandoned plan to construct a hydro- 
power station in a nature reserve in Austria, have come under heavy attack from environ- 
mental groups. They have cautioned against damaging the ecology of the river, destroy- 
ing the wetlands of north-west Hungary, and adversely affecting the ground water. 
Mainly as a result of these projects, the development of the river has become a visible and 
controversial public issue in the upper and middle riparian countries. 
Already in 1977, the WHO warned that  pollution controls on the Danube were not 
adequate (WHO, 1977). The pollution problems are in some case worsening mainly as a 
result of the rapid economic development of the Danube basin and the accompanying 
increase in point and non-point pollution sources. As counter measures, a t  least for the 
organic pollution, many urban centers have or are constructing sewage treatment plants. 
Without further measures, the planned construction of barrages and hydropower stations 
6 
may also have an effect on water quality. 
In sum, the expected rapid economic development in the Danube basin, the planned 
opening of the Rhine-Maine-Danube canal, and the continuing construction of barrages 
and hydropower stations will contribute to a change in Danube water quality, along with 
possibly other ecological consequences. The costs of this river water degradation as well 
as the benefits from the development of the Danube are not evenly distributed among the 
riparian countries. The more prosperous upper riparians depend on the Danube mostly 
for industrial and waste disposal purposes and benefit disproportionately from the water 
power potential; the less-developed lower riparians are more dependent on the river for 
drinking water, irrigation, fisheries, and a large tourist industry a t  the Black Sea. As a 
 he issue whether barrages and hydropower stations contribute to  worsening water pollution is controver- 
sial and not fully resolved within the  scientific community.  Barrages and dams  block the  flow of suspended 
particles which may then accumulate on some stretches of the  river bed, providing a possible long-term 
reservoir of pollutants and influencing the  water exchange between the  ground water and the  river. More- 
over, they reduce the  velocity of the  river flow and, in this way, lessen i t s  capacity for regeneration from or- 
ganic pollution. This  loss in oxygen may be compensated, however, by the  increase of the  water surface and 
- 
by the  aeration of the  water a t  the  barrages. 
migration of these substances into water resources and their dispersion. According to an 
experienced water modeler, the concept of water quality is intrinsically dynamic and unc- 
ertain and the s tandard dispersion assumptions are often oversimplified l 2  (Beck, 1980, p. 
214). 
The environmental group perspective 
Since water serves basic human needs, any serious reduction in its supply or  quality 
is, in the words of Frey and Naff (1984) "a fighting matter ,  as many a range war in the 
United States has demonstrated" (p.76). Under conditions of severe shortage, water or  
"good quality water" becomes for many key actors a highly sensitized, zero-sum, public 
issue, and one with alarming potential for conflict. 
The  issue of Danube water quality is by no means a fighting matter! T o  the con- 
trary, it has the  s ta tus  of a routine, regulatory problem in tha t  it is moderately low-key 
and disaggregated among organizations.13 There are some indications, however, tha t  i t  
might evolve into a more contentious public issue involving citizen action and environ- 
mental groups. Jus t  as the "toxic problem" has become a dominant issue in North Amer- 
ica and in some European countries, there is also growing concern over toxic pollutants by 
environmental groups and the ~ u b l i c  of the Danube countries. The  recent accidents 
resulting in toxic poisoning of the Rhine river have dramatically intensified this concern 
by focusing attention on problems of acute, toxic water pollution. 
12water  pollution is not the only issue in river management characterized by large uncertainties. Scientific 
opinion differs widely on such topics as the effects of artificial reservoirs on a region's ground water, the ex- 
tent to which flood protection, irrigation, and drainage change the fertility of the soil, the transport of pollu- 
tants in a river, including changes in the transport of sediment and the accumulation of silt from water 
works, the efficiency of filtering techniques for drinking water, the possibility and implications of long-term 
fluctuations in water supply, and generally the prediction of environmental consequences of water develop- 
ment. 
13see Lowi (1984). 
IV. UPSTREAM-DO WNSTREAM DISPUTES 
Effective cooperation for managing the Danube, and especially far caping with 
transfrontier water pollution, will rest ultimately on  establishing the  canditians and 
incentives for this cooperation. These conditions are frustrated by the "upstream- 
downstream" geopolitics of international rivers, where the  upper riparians have distinct 
advantages in such policy areas a s  flood control, apportionment of water supplies, and 
especially river water contamination. The  bargaining chips of the downstream countries 
may be limited to  such areas as granting navigation rights or  contributing to  joint hydro- 
power projects. 
If negotiation is characterized as an interactive process by which two or  more parties 
or countries seek cooperatively to  d o  better than they would have otherwise, then their 
alternatives to negotiation determine in some sense their negotiating power (Lax and 
Sebenius, 1985). It  follows tha t  negotiations can be most productive when this power is 
evenly distributed or when all parties are capable of contributing to  a common good (or 
reducing a common bad) without which each would equally suffer (gain). When these 
conditions are lacking, such a s  in the "upstream-downstream" situation, then one can 
speak of power asymmetry (Zartman, 1985). One (or more) parties likes things the way 
they are and the  other (or others) wants t o  change them. Those who want changes do  
not have the  means t o  provide incentives to those interested in maintaining the  s tatus 
quo. Negotiations can be stymied when there appear t o  be no ~ossibilities for trade, or 
when one or more of the parties is reluctant or  unwilling to  negotiate. 
This  asymmetry appears particularly troubling for the Danube river. As upper 
riparians, the  FRG, Austria, and Czechoslovakia have less direct interest in improving 
water quality (the proportion of water in these countries used for drinking, irrigation, 
fisheries and tourism is less than for the  countries further downstream), and have further 
advantages as well. With the exception of Northern Hungary and the  Iron Ga te  region, 
the energy potential of t he  Danube is found mainly in the upstream countries, which are 
also more industrialized than many of their downstream neighbors and thus potentidly 
have more chronic and accidental discharges into the water. Aa for navigation, the 
CMEA countries' interests in an unrestricted navigation route to  the  Atlantic are a t  lemt 
as great as the Western European intereste in an unrestricted Eastern route. In sum, 
there appear t o  be weaker incentives for the upper Danube riparians t o  cooperate with 
those further downstream. Alternatively, the downstream countries, with their large 
fisheries, tourist industry, and greater dependence on the Danube for potable water and 
irrigation, have a great deal t o  gain by cooperative policies, especially regarding water 
quality. In the opinion of the secretary of the Vienna-based International Society for 
Danube Research, the problems presented by the upstream-downstream ~ o l i t i c s  are more 
formidable for multilateral cooperation than the problems presented by the East-West 
politics ( Weber, 1986). 
The issue of "upstream-downstream" is not, however, so clear as i t  may a t  first 
appear. Each of the Danube riparian countries lies both upstream and downstream on 
either the Danube or other rivers crossing its bordcrs; each country has an internal 
interest in improving the water quality within its borders;14 and many new factors of 
joint interests (such as groundwater) are emerging. In the words of a former member of 
the Indus Commission: 
... all riparian conflicts must be conditioned by the recognition that  fresh-water 
diplomacy is a symbol and the test for the fundamental features of interna- 
tional relations: how t o  balance national interest (the domestic demands which 
go with availability of water and the emotion which goes with notions of terri- 
torial sovereignty) and the uncontrollable imperatives of international inter- 
dependence. We now have new factors which underline that  "beggar the neigh- 
bor" approach, and ignoring the logic of integral unity of river basin and com- 
mon stakes in the optimal progress of upper and lower riparian partners, is 
self-destructive. Ecology and groundwater potential which do not respect polit- 
ical frontiers and do  not necessarily give advantage to  the upper riparians are 
compulsive new considerations. (Mehta, 1986, p. 23) 
1 4 ~ h e  most upstream riparian, the FRG, has one of the best reputations in the overzll managernert .- . 
rivers. 
Even recognizing these emerging, compulsive new factors, inter-barin cooperation 
will continue to encompass issue areas, such as water pollution, characterized by unequal 
negotiating power. Their solution will presuppose the existence of "political will" on the 
part of the basin states. Since the real financial costs of measures such as pollution con- 
trol may be substantial, and since national sovereignty is inevitably compromised through 
international cooperation, some compensating advantage or incentive to  the upper 
riparian states is a prerequisite for cooperation. 
The need for incentives is reinforced by the rudimentary and relatively ineffectual 
state of international law as a means of regulating water issues. Traditionally, four 
theories governing the use of international rivers have been advocated: ( I )  the Harmon 
Doctrine which advocates absolute sovereignty to upper riparians; (2) absolute territorial 
integrity which guarantees the lower riparians the use of the river in an unaltered state; 
(3) drainage basin development which stresses mutual development of a river's waters by 
all riparian states; and, (4) the equitable utilization theory, or limited territorial 
sovereignty, which permits use of a river's waters to the extent of doing no harm to other 
riparian countries (Le Marquand, 1978). This latter principle of "reasonable and equit- 
able" utilization of water resources15 has now been established by such distinguished 
bodies as the International Law Association and International Law Commission of the 
United Nations. These principles and guidelines are not, however, binding law and are 
not backed up by agreed-upon legal structures for settling international water disputes 
(Caponera, 1985). Moreover, these principles are only just evolving to deal directly with 
transboundary water pollution. 
1 5 ~ h e  quitable utilization theory has become the most widely advocated, not only by the international le- 
gal community, but also as evidenced by treaties, judicial decisions, academics and international bodies (Ut- 
ton, 1983). 
Linkages 
With the lack of effective international rules, and when one or more of the negotiat- 
ing partners lacks incentives to agree, broadening the negotiating agenda or linking even 
disparate issues may increase the bargaining potential of all countries. Even between 
countries where there are few explicit tradeoffs, one country may wish to build up a 
"reservoir of good will" to draw upon in future dealings. The potential of problem link- 
ages in resolving long-standing stalemates was seen in a case involving the Colorado river, 
where the United States as the upstream country finally agreed to build a costly desalina- 
tion plant only after river pollution was linked to other problems between Mexico and the 
United States (Ganz, 1972). The long deadlocked negotiations were only fruitfully 
resumed when the salinity issue became critically important to  relations between Mexico 
and the United States. 
Whereas the theory of environmental (and other) linkages is attractive for reframing 
issues and facilitating bargaining, too little attention has been given to the institutional 
and procedural obstacles for putting theory into practice. Environmental policy making 
has become increasingly specialized and fragmented, reducing the possibilities for more 
wholistic approaches.'' Expanding the water cluality negotiation agenda to  include, say, 
controls for dealing with acid rain or even groundwater introduces a staggering degree of 
complexity into the process. From a procedural perspective, this may be possible only by 
moving the issue to  a higher political level as was the case in the Mexico-United States 
negotiations. 
A special kind of linkage involves monetary compensation or "side payments". 
While paying the polluting country to clean up violates the polluter-pays-principle, it 
may be the only route to promote the desired changes, as evidenced by the recent 
" ~ e  Marquand (1978) has shown t h a t  this fraglnentation is also apparent within the  foreign policy institu- 
tions which may be responsible for conducting the  negotiations, but which are dependent on other  govern- 
ment insti tutions (such as justice, finance, water resources, and environment) for technical expertise nnc! 
resources. Without  interference and direction from above, the foreign affairs depar tment  may be severely 
restricted in the  policy options it can pursue. 
proposal t ha t  the Netherlands and the FRG compensate France for the  costly process 
changes necessary t o  reduce the salinity of the Rhine. Another type of linkage, which is 
relevant mainly for the developing world, is international loans and subsidiea for river 
development. Mehta  (1986) describes how the World Bank with its lure of development 
funds became an  independent arbi t rator  in the negotiations leading t o  the  Indus Water  
Treaty (1960), which is one of the few examples of successful negotiations on a major 
international river. LeMarquand (1986) describes a similar process of agreement on the 
Senegal river, where the perspective funds from the international community for its 
large-scale development served t o  mute  much interstate conflict. 
V. COOPERATION THROUGH BILATERAL, STEPWISE NEGOTIATIONS 
Improving the water quality of the Danube through cooperative decision making will 
be seriously complicated by the power asymmetry between the upstream and downstream 
riparians and the scientifically complex and ill-defined nature of the water  pollution issue. 
Cooperative policy making will also be hampered by the lack of an  existing river basin 
regime for multilateral, integrated decision making on the Danube. This  section describes 
the policy making process which will likely evolve in response t o  the formidable problems 
accompanying the  implementation of the Danube Declaration. 
In signing the non-binding Danube Declaration, ministers from the eight riparian 
countries declared that :  
The  governments of the Danube states  will endeavor t o  solve, stepwise, 
through bilateral and multilateral agreements, the concrete problems of the 
Danube, especially with respect t o  its water quality, which is of life-giving 
importance t o  the Danube countries. (p. 1.) 
Of special interest is how the  signing ministers of these eight countries intend t o  secure 
the cooperation necessary for dealing with the manifold issues of Danube water quality. 
In this regard, the  above quote from the Danube Declaration is revealing, especially i ts  
wording "to solve stepwise through bilateral and multilateral agreements". Any progr- 
on combatting the pollution of the Danube will be made through narrowly focused, rather 
than integrated and more comprehensive agreements, between two o r  maybe cluatere of 
countries. As expressed by a member of the Austrian-Czechoslovakian Border Cornmi* 
sion, the non-binding Danube Declaration should be viewed primarily ae a signal for the 
riparian countries t o  establish more encompassing bilateral agreements, particularly in 
addressing problems of water quality (Schmidt, 1986). 
"Functional and participant" incrementalism appears, therefore, t o  be the explicit 
strategy envisaged by the signing ministers of the Danube Declaration. In this context, 
incrementalism means making progress by stages, or often ad hoe sequencing, related t o  
Lindblom's (1959) seminal description of "disjointed incrementalism". As increasingly 
complex problems emerge on the international negotiating agenda, the political actors 
often muddle through with strategic blinders -- structuring the issues and bounding each 
subissue in such a way that  it is reduced in its complexity (Linnerooth, 1984). Functional 
incrementalism, then, means that  progress is made by partial rather than wholistic 
improvements. A counterpart t o  this functional incrementalism is the concept of partici- 
pant incrementalism, where agreements are first negotiated only among the most recep 
tive participants with the intention of adding to  this core consensus through subsequent 
negotiations. 
Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements: Participant Incrementalism 
The Danube Declaration has set the stage for individual country initiatives in nego- 
tiating agreements with neighboring countries, in other words, for cooperation through 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements. This stands in contrast with the 20th century 
theme of basin-wide where various forms of river basin commissions deal 
cooperatively on managing water resources common t o  more than one jurisdiction. Ther- 
are many different types of river basin organizations with widely-different functions, rang- 
ing from the integrated management of a drainage basin or watercourse system,17 the 
management of, e.g., a development project through a single-purpose commission,18 or the 
management of data  and  statistic^.'^ These institutions also differ re~arding their respec- 
tive powers and procedures. Of special interest here are some those commissions with 
explicit mandates t o  anticipate disputes between the riparians and to facilitate their reso- 
~ u t i o n . ~ ~  Helping resolve disputes is critically important, especially since there are few 
examples of multi-purpose commissions with significant decision-making power.21 Accord- 
ing to  Caponera (1985, p. 569-570) 
National interests often prevail when shared resources have.to be allocated, 
when priorities have to  be established among different uses, and when decisions 
have to be enforced. Decision making on these issues seldom rests in a joint 
commission, committee, or like institution. More often, all relevant decisions 
are negotiated piecemeal and approved unanimously by all states concerned, 
whether separately or within a collegiate body. Institutionalized cooperation is 
more successful in preparing the necessary data  for decision making. 
Though practically nonexistent on the international level, there has been important 
experience with multi-purpose, integrated commissions for dealing with regional water 
problems on the national (federal) level, for example, the interstate river administrations 
existing in Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United States and India. The river basin 
concept has also spurred the emergence of a new type of regional institute, the valley 
authority, a trend which also became apparent a t  the international level in the sixties. 22 
17J?or example, the Niger River Authority has the purpose of insuring an integrated development program 
for all Niger basin water resources and activities. 
18For example, the Danube Commission haa responsibility only for navigation. 
1 9 ~ e w  institutional mechanisms in the form of joint permanent technical committees have recently been 
created in Southern Africa (Caponera, 1985). For the Danube, this function is filled, but only to some ex- 
tent, by the International Association for Danube Research, itself a part of the International Society for 
Limonology. This inter-basin association carries out research on topics related t o  the chemical, biological 
and general life properties of the Danube, but does not do any policy related research. I t  would be of only 
limited value, thus, in advising on the priorities to be established for different uses and users of the river. 
2 0 ~ o r  example, the Niger River Commission waa created among the nine riparian countries for planning, ex- 
changing information, preparing recommended decisions to be taken by member governments, and facilitot- 
ing the settlement of disputes between the parties. Also, the International Joint Commission (IJC) between 
Canada and the U.S. waa originally created for preventing and settling water disputes. 
" ~ n  exception may be the Senegal River Basin Management organization (OMVS) with four rip::.-;:.- 
members which encourages and coordinates water resources development in the Senegal. The unnnixxc:.; 
cisions of the Conference of the Council of Ministries of the OMVS automatically bind its n e : ~ b e r  s*.r.-:- 
(see Le Marquand, 1986). 
"1n an analysis of federal experience with interstate authorities, Alheritiere (1978) shows that  the idea of 
establishing a supranational, integrated, multi-purpose drainage basin commission is largely utopian, and 
Besides facilitating the resolution of riparian disputes, another important function of 
a multinational, integrated organization is its potential for buildng transnational and 
transgovernmental coalitions to deal with multiple and imperfectly linked issues (Keohane 
and Nye, 1977). However, as Majone (1986) has argued with respect to global regulatory 
agencies, there may be serious conceptual and pragmatic problems with organizations 
responsible for coordinating policies with widely differing local causes and consequences, 
i.e. the high transaction costs involved and the reluctance of nations to sacrifice their 
sovereignty. Aside from the many advantages and disadvantages, it is unlikely that  rnini- 
governments with the power to legislate and implement river basin policies across 
national boundaries will emerge. The role of interboundary commissions in defining nego- 
tiating agendas, linking issues, and facilitating the negotiating process may, on the other 
hand, have considerate potential promise. 
The political obstacles for creating a supra-national, river commission for the 
Danube, or even a multi-purpose commission with limited powers, are apparent from the 
history of the Danube Commission. This single-purpose Commission has been the most 
influential international organization dealing with the Danube, though only with responsi- 
bility for matters regarding navigation.23 Resuscitated after the Second World War, it is 
a decidedly riparian institution, but where the FRG continues to have observer status 
only. In many respects the Commission may be considered a prototype for East-West 
cooperation in a narrowly-defined functional field (Pichler, 1973):~ but this same 
cooperation is not likely to develop in areas outside of navigation. 
may be unnecessary. Some of the more effective interstate policies have been set by conlmissions not dealing 
with the entire river basin or not having jurisdiction over all the uses of the river. 
2 3 ~ u r r e n t l y ,  the Danube river is regulated by the Belgrad Convention of 1948 and by a series of special 
agreements. The Danube Commission deals with problems concerning the regulation of the Danube for na- 
vigation purposes, the maintenance of the navigable channels, regulations regarding signals, safety matters, 
etc., measures against the obstruction of channels with ice, taxes on ship traffic, development of the Danube 
fleet, improvement of navigation technology, development of industries and harbors, and general water 
management. I t  plays only a small role in energy projects and flood control. 
2 4 ~ h e  processes of the DC have been described as cumbersome and sometimes frustratingly slow - and its 
secretariat remains largely powerless; yet, it has functioned quite effectively as an instrument of East-West 
cooperation. The principle of unanimity has protected those in the minority from being forced into decisions 
to which they object and the search for a consensus has often resulted in constructive compromises. 
As Pichler (1973) writes, it would have been natural for the highly-qualified and ever 
increasing membership of the Danube Commission to have expanded its authority from 
that  of navigation to  areas such as energy production and water planning. But this 
integrative process did not occur and for deliberate political reasons. The neutral and 
non-alligned countries, Austria and Yugoslavia, formed a blocking coalition preventing 
the USSR from expanding the influence of the Danube Commission, and thus its own 
influence, beyond that  of navigation. According to Schmitter (1970) this was a ~ r e d i c t -  
able process of regional integration, where decisions of the commission were "encapsu- 
lated" rather than allowed to spill over into other areas. 
What is clear from the history of the Danube Commission is that  cooperation among 
the eight riparian countries on issues such as transfrontier water pollution will not be 
facilitated through the creation of a multi-purpose commission with the breadth to make 
politicized tradeoffs between the conflicting interests or uses of the river or even with the 
power to facilitate negotiations. A single-purpose commission for water quality monitor- 
ing and pollution control, as advocated by, e.g., Bendel and Laszlo (1980) , also does not 
appear likely a t  the current time. In the absence of an international river basin authority, 
the most likely mechanism for achieving collaboration appears to be through mainly bila- 
teral agreements. A look a t  Table I1 shows that ,  with only two exceptions, all agreements 
and treaties for the Danube tributaries and especially the border waters have been bila- 
teral. 
What this style of river management means, in contrast to an idealized multi- 
purpose, supra-national, basin-wide commission, is that  joint decisions will be made 
through agreements involving complex procedures of international and intranational, 
pluralistic bargaining. In Austria, for example, authority for the Danube, both domesti- 
cally and internationally, is spread among six federal government ministries and their 
Table 11. Some multilateral and bilateral agreements concerning the Danube (WHO,  
1982). 
1952 Romania, USSR I I onvention to prevent floods and regulate 
Year  
1948 
( 1  
1950 
1954 ustria, Yugoslavia onvention concerning water economy 
uestions relating to R. Drava 
1954 ustria, Yugoslavia Convention concerning water economy 
uestions relating to  R. Mura 
1955 Romania, Yugoslavia greement concerning control of 
rontier waters I / 
11955 I ~ u n ~ a r ~ ,  Yugoslavia bgreement concerning water economy I 
Countr ies  
(Austria), Bulgaria 




(1956 bus t r i a ,  Hungary concerning water economy in 
rontier regions 
Topic  of agreement 
Danube Convention on navigation of Danube 
Convention to prevent floods and regulate 
R. Tisza 
11956 /Albania, Yugoslavia greement concerning water economy 
frontier regions 
1957 Hungary, Yugoslavia I I Agreement concerning fishing in k rontier waters 
11958 ICSSR, Poland greement concerning use of frontier 
ater resources 
1957 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia greement concerning water 
Romania, USSR greement extending R. P ru t  convention 
to  Tisza, Suceava and Siret, and oth- 
1959 Romania, USSR I I greement extending R. Pru t  (1952) to  Danube 
1963 Romania, Yugoslavia I I greement relating to  navigation power generation Iron Gates 
(1967 kus t r i a ,  CSSR Treaty relating to management of k rontier waters 
1969 Hungary, Romania I I onvention relating to  control of 
1971 Germany,  F R ,  CSSR Local (non-government) commission dealing 
with pollution and management of frontier 
waters 
various service ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n s . ' ~  The  jurisdiction of these federal ministries ends with the 
Danube and border waters; responsibility for all other Austrian rivers rests with the Aus- 
trian provinces.26 Environmental groups are also arriving on the scene with strong pro- 
tests over the possible ecological and water quality consequences of the planned hydro- 
power stations in Austria as well as further downstream. 
While the federal government in Austria has full control over the  Danube, this is not 
the case for two neighboring muntr ies ,  the FRG and the CSSR, where the respective s ta te  
(Land) governments have the primary responsibility for all rivers within their territories. 
Hungary might be  considered a t  the other extreme of Austria, since most of the  com- 
petence for the  Danube river is found in one central body, the  National Water  Authority. 
S t e p w i s e  A g r e e m e n t s :  F u n c t i o n a l  I n c r e m e n t a l i s m  
The  difficulties in coordinating measures and testing protocols for conventional 
water pollution and the huge number of proven and potentially toxic substances which 
find their way into water supplies underscores the need for regulatory attention t o  be 
selective. A comprehensive policy for water pollution with the  many diverse sources and 
effects of hazardous pollutants would overwhelm any regulatory authority as  well a s  
efforts t o  negotiate a common policy between two or more countries. Setting boundaries 
on the negotiating agenda and proceeding stepwise through the  intricacies of the problem 
will be essential. 2 7 
2 5 ~ h e  Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry has responsibility for the water quality of the Danube and 
frontier waters; whereas the Ministry of Health and Environment must assure safe drinking water. Hydro- 
electric and other projects must be approved by the Ministry for Construction and Technology, which has a 
special fund (Water Management Fund) for subsidizing sewage systems and water treatment plants. The 
Water Police (Strom Polizei), which are responsible for enforcing the navigation codes, are located within 
the Ministry for the Interior, whereas the Shipping Police (Schiffahrts Polizei), which assure that the chan- 
nel is properly marked, etc., are part of the Ministry of Transportation. Coordinating water policies with 
other countries brings in another governmental authority, the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
2 6 ~ h i s  dispersed authority can lead to serious problems in coordination, for instance, if the Ministry T: 
Agriculture and Forestry detects a change in the water quality of the Danube, it may find it ditficult 
track the source of the pollution to the tributaries which are outside its jurisdiction. 
2 7 ~ e e  Dowling and Linnerooth (1984) for a discussion of the political bounding of a similar issce, c!?F 
hazardous wastes. 
As emphasized by the Danube Declaration, the first step in grappling with the mani- 
fold problems of improving Danube water quality is arriving a t  a common agreement on 
what water quality is and how it should be tested. This means harmonizing the many 
divergent testing protocols found on the Danube, a process which will meet all the 
definitional and administrative complications discussed in Section 1 1 1 . ~ ~  
The Austrian-Czechoslovakian Agreement  on Testing the 
Water  Quali ty of the Frontier Water s  
The workings of the Austrian-Czechoslovakian Border  omm mission,^^ and a recent 
agreement within this Commission on common definitions and testing protocols for 
measuring the water quality of the frontier waters,30 presents a good example of the incre- 
mental (participant and functional) procedures set out in the Danube Declaration. This 
agreement, marking the first stage in the eventual improvement of Danube water quality, 
involved only two countries, and discussions were confined to a narrow concept of water 
quality. Besides oxygen content and biological indices, the measures included water pH, 
ammonia, nitrates and nitrites, phosphorus, chloride, calcium, magnesium, mineral oil, 
and the hardness of the water. The agreed-upon protocol did not include tests for heavy 
metals, ~esticides,  carcinogens, and other toxic substances found, for example, on the EC 
Black List. Despite its limited scope, it is valuable as a first step in reaching an overall 
basin-wide agreement on da ta  collection for water quality measurements, and it may 
serve as a model for further riparian agreements (Schmidt, 1986). The way in which this 
agreement was reached, then, is of interest, 
2 8 ~ h e s e  obstacles to  coordinating technical definitions and practices have been clearly illustrated by at- 
tempts on the part of the European Economic Community in harmonizing standards for water quality, 
which have met with resistance from countries with different administrative working definitions. For exam- 
ple, the U.K. has developed a philosophy of performance-based standards which is contrary to the EC's con- 
cept of uniform limit values (see Biggs, 1980). 
2 9 ~ e e  the Treaty Concerning the Regulation of Water Management Questions Relating to Frontier Waters, 
Dec. 7., 1967, Austria-Czechoslovakia, art.  314, 728 UNTS 
30~emeinsame Methodik der Untersuchungen des Ciitezustandes der Osterreichisch-Tschech~slowakischer! 
Crenzwcsser, 1986. 
The loosely-knit Border Commission is composed of four commissioners from each 
country, representing separate federal ministries concerned with different aspects of water 
management. When problems concerning the border waters (e.g. regulation, Rood con- 
trol, water supply, etc.) come to  their attention, usually a working group of experts from 
both countries is established which makes recommendations to  the Commission. These 
recommendations are approved only with unanimous agreement among the eight commis- 
sioners. Once agreements are reached by the Commission, they must then be ratified by 
the respective federal Parliaments. Over a period of six years the Austrian and 
Czechoslovakian expert committee for establishing testing protocols met regularly and,  
with the eventual imposition of a deadline by the Commission, reached an  agreement. 
Having agreed within the expert committee, approval by both the Border Commission 
and the respective national Parliaments was p r o  f ~ r r n a . ~ ~  This represents an  example, 
then, of negotiation and decision by expert committee. 
The  question arises why there exists the current interest on the part  of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia in coordinating policies leading eventually to  an improvement in the 
ity of the frontier rivers, especially Austria's interest as the upstream country. The  
answer appears to  lie in the long-standing concern on the part of both countries in 
improving the water quality of the badly polluted March, a river forming the border 
between Austria and CSSR and an  important tributary to  the Danube. This interest has 
become acute for both countries with the current plans to construct the Gabcikovo- 
Nagymaros barrage and hydroelectric system which requires an  improvement in the 
organic water quality of the Danube. For Austria, which plans to  participate in the 
financing of this project and,  in return, will receive electric power, the water quality issue 
has been linked with its interests in hydropower generation in the downstream countries. 
3 1 ~ h e  Austrian Parliament has ratified the agreement (Oct, 1986) and Czechoslovakian ratification is ex- 
pected shortly. 
VI. OUTLOOK: A Role for the Analyst? 
The signing ministers of the Danube Declaration have emphasized that a balanced 
management of the Danube river can be achieved only through cooperation among the 
eight riparian countries. Establishing this cooperation, especially on improving the water 
quality of the Danube, will be complicated by the power asymmetry between the 
upstream and downstream countries, the scientifically complex and ill-defined nature of 
the problem and the lack of an effective river basin authority for multilateral, integrated 
decision making on the Danube. 
A more comprehensive and expedient program for tackling the problems of Danube 
water pollution is also limited by the inherent difficulties sovereign states face in negotiat- 
ing environmental issues, generally. In a recent article, von Moltke (1987) questions 
whether sovereign states can speak for all interests within their jurisdiction, and particu- 
larly for the needs of environmental protection. Since environmental resources will likely 
not be assigned rights by international law in the foreseeable future, the most that  can be 
hoped for is an enlargement of the circle of participants recognized as having legitimate 
interests and a right for ~art icipation in the international negotiations. Progress will not 
be rapid. International negotiating processes have adjusted slowly to the existence of 
non-governmental participants. 
As a low key issue, progress on Danube water pollution will undoubtedly continue 
very slowly within the incremental procedures laid out in the Danube Declaration. Only 
as the issue becomes more urgent from the perspective of the scientific community and 
from the standpoint of the public can more expedient actions be anticipated, but only to  
the extent that  these groups gain standing on the negotiating agenda. The public visibil- 
ity of the Danube water pollution issue in the different riparian countries is therefore crit- 
ical to  the progress of negotiated solutions; this visibility will depend t o  a large extent on 
the economic development of the countries and the corresponding consciousness and con- 
cern about environmental problems on the part of the public and the scientific commun- 
i ty. At  the present, this consciousness varies widely a~rrong the eight riparians. 
A Role for the Analyst? 
Even if Danube water quality emerges as an urgent public issue with corresponding 
pressures on international negotiators, difficult scientific issues, and equally perplexing 
institutional problems, will s tand  in the  path of its resolution. With the complexity of 
both the  scientific issues and the  procedural mechanisms, analysts have become concerned 
about how they can be more effective, not only in identifying transfrontier environmental 
problems and alternatives for their solution, but  also in providing support for negotiating 
international treaties and agreements for their resolution. The  use of computerized sup- 
port systems for aiding policy makers and negotiators has become especially topical. 
A wide range of scientific opinion accompanies most environmental issues. In the 
case of the  Danube, for example, there are serious conflicts concerning the effects of river 
development projects on the  quality of the Danube water, the ground water,  and the  gen- 
eral ecology of the  river basin. Many view the negotiation process, thus, as  foremost an 
exercise in joint learning t o  reach common understandings and eventual solutions. An 
hypothesis underlying much of the literature on the use of computers t o  facilitate or aid 
negotiations is t ha t  information forms a neutral ground for agreement which can free the 
path for trading off legitimate differences in interests. Raiffa (1984), in noting the enor- 
mous scientific complexity in international environmental disputes, notes also the impor- 
t an t  question of the interrelation between facts and interests: 
Negotiators must  argue the merits of their cases, but they don't know the phy- 
sical facts. There is a need for some mutual learning. How d o  they learn 
together and still protect their own interests? T h a t  is the  beauty of the prob- 
lem. (p.45) 
This  problem of learning together is fundamental to  the  use of computer support sys- 
tems in aiding negotiations. In this section, I will briefly discuss the potential and limita- 
tions of computer aided negotiations (CAN) for two distinctly different negotiation set- 
tings: (I )  the "win-win'' bargaining setting where all the parties perceive mutual gains in 
cooperative behavior, and (2) the more adversarial setting where the parties perceive 
more "win-lose" outcomes. The former can be likened to the routine negotiation of water 
quality testing between Austria and Czechoslovakia, whereas the latter is more represen- 
tative of the water quality issue as it becomes enmeshed in the disputes involving environ- 
mental groups over the conflict between river development and ecological   reservation of 
the river. 
M u t u a l  learning and "win-win" bargaining 
Less adversarial, "win-win" negotiations are more receptive to joint learning and 
cooperative problem solving than disputes for which the advantages of arriving a t  mutual 
compromises are not so apparent. The most outstanding example of the use of the com- 
puter in a negotiation in which all parties perceived possible benefits was the U.N. Law of 
the Sea Conference (for a full account, see Sebenius, 1981). Because of its likeness to 
many international negotiations for river development, it deserves mention here. 
The resolution of the problem of the deep sea mining of "manganese modules" 32 
became important for an international agreement on the common use of the oceans. Prior 
to  the negotiations, the U.N. General Assembly declared the deep sea resources to be the 
"common heritage of mankind", and the task of the negotiations was to  find a system for 
their equitable sharing. A conflict developed between the developing and developed coun- 
tries concerning the profitability of deep sea-bed mining and how the proceeds from min- 
ing enterprises could be fairly distributed. After six years of intensive negotiations, a 
compromise agreement was reached by the over 140 countries, which appears to  have 
been partly attributable to  the joint exploration and learning made possible by a com- 
puter model developed a t  the Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology showing ~uh?  
3 2 ~ h e  modules are composed of commercially promising quantities of copper, cobalt, nickel, and manganese. 
engineering and financial aspects of module recovery and processing. 
Sebenius (1981) attributes the acceptance of the model largely to the properties of 
the model, itself, that  established it as unbiased, objective, and credible.33 Since similar 
examples of mutual learning and model acceptance are so few, and since all modeling 
efforts - the MIT model included - have an inherent, subjective component, it is important 
to look beyond the model to the conditions of the negotiations, themselves, which led to a 
willingness of the part of the delegates to find a consensus on the structure and analytics 
of the problem. One likely factor was the "win-win" nature of the negotiations, which 
gave a strong incentive for the delegates to resolve the distributive questions. Also the 
relative newness of the issue and accompanying lack of entrenched interests within coun- 
tries made it easier for delegates to embrace an outside ~ r o b l e m  formulation. Without 
the overriding need to justify their positions in their own countries, the delegates had 
more flexibility to  accept "neutral" evidence. Finally, the delegates represented, for the 
most part,  government ministries, e.g. finance and foreign affairs, which means that  in 
spite of their national differences they shared a certain professional rationality and thus a 
common overall frame of the issue. 
Although on a more modest level, these same conditions exist in many negotiation 
forums, such as the bilateral expert committee appointed by the Austrian- 
Czechoslovakian Border Commission to work out an agreement on testing protocols for 
the quality of the border waters. The informal, side-by-side work of these expert commit- 
tees allows flexibility for brainstorming and joint problem solving. Fisher (1986) has con- 
trasted this style of negotiation with more formal, around-the-table diplomatic sessions, 
and has stressed the advantages of the reduced authority of advisory commi ttees giving 
the members more freedom to  explore interests and t o  invent options that  might promote 
33~ccording to Sebenius, several factors influenced the acceptance of the model: (1) the model was 
developed independently of the LOS Conference; (2)  the model's early results fully pleased no delegation, 
confirming in some sense its neutrality; (3) the presentation of the model's results by the h4IT groups 
highlighted the uncertainties, increasing further its credibility; and (4) the chairman of the financial group, 
who was highly respected by the delegates, strongly favored the use of the model. 
shared concerns and accommodate those that differ (p. 138). Independent, outside exper- 
tise can then be brought in to aid the negotiation. in much the name way u the MIT 
model was used in the LOS Conference. 
In other words, limited-authority committees may provide fertile ground For the use  
of independently developed, interactive models to aid negotiators of water resources. 
These models will have a narrow perspective because of the usually narrowly-defined 
problems with which these committees deal. Loucks, et. al. (1985), in reviewing some 
thirty years of systems models in water resources management, conclude that  the diarp  
pointing influence of comprehensive regional or basin-wide studies on negotiated ~olicies 
can be attributed, in part, to  the failure of these models to meet the narrower agendas 
and needs of the decision makers and negotiators. They applaud, thus, the apparent shift 
to the more project-oriented models addressing narrower issues: 
Policy changes will continue to be incremental and, barring serious surprises, 
decisions will rarely be revolutionary. Hence, policy modelers and analysts 
should focus their problem and issue-oriented research on helping to guide these 
incremental changes. (p. 229) 
Recognizing both the value of an integrated system in clarifying the complex 
tradeoffs a t  a more aggregated level, e.g. the relation between deforestation and river 
water quality, and the need of decision makers and negotiators to  have narrower, more 
disaggregated information, Kovacs (1986) proposes a hierarchal system of decision sup- 
port systems for managing large international rivers which can anticipate the expected 
consequences of policy options a t  various levels of decision making. For basin-wide 
planners, the model would give aggregated results which could be disaggregated for the 
types of decisions negotiated by, e.g., such bodies as Border Commissions. 
Mutual Learning and Adversarial Negotiations 
On February 8 of this year (1986), some 100 brave Hungarian and Austrian 
environmentalists attempted to  march around Margaret Island in the middle of 
the Danube a t  Budapest. They were expressing their concern over the damage 
that  they believe will result from the construction and operation of the pro- 
posed Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectic system. This is an  example of pro- 
tests tha t  have occurred much more frequently throughout the west -- protests 
over adverse impacts tha t  are perceived will happen as a result of some pro- 
posed water resource development scheme. In fact, there is no shortage of 
disputes over issues involving water resources anywhere in the world. (Loucks 
and Salewicz, 1986, ~ . l )  
Protests in Austria and Hungary over river development projects are only just 
emerging and signal a beginning interest of environmental groups in the Danube. These 
groups, however, have yet t o  gain standing on Danube negotiations. Still, with the emer- 
gence of such groups, analysts must confront the problems of dispute settlement. Loucks 
and Salewicz (1986) suggest a role for information sharing and mutual learning in nego- 
tiating a resolution to  adversarial environmental disputes. Information sharing, in the 
form of interactive, decision or negotiation support, could facilitate more informed nego- 
tiations by, a t  least, focusing the debate on the assumptions and data.  
Their advocacy of information systems as a way of facilitating multi-stakeholder 
disputes fails t o  account, however, for some fundamental differences between situations in 
which negotiation participants want to  solve a common problem cooperatively from one 
in which (potentially hostile) parties view the outcomes more as zero-sum alternatives. 
Research in multiperson decision support systems (DSS) has mostly addressed the first 
situation where knowledge sharing and preference aggregation have been the main issues. 
The  majority of these DSS systems have been employed in essentially a common problem 
or problem frame (Jarke, 1986). Neither of these assumptions are generally appropriate 
for more adversarial bargaining among groups with different perceptions of the problem 
and different logics or  rationalities for dealing with it .  For these situations, a fund%.-"- 
tal shift will be necessary to  orient negotiation support away from "information, ana lys i~  
and solution" to providing mechanisms for communicating, and maybe finding 
on the different subjective representatives of the problem by the different actors. 
In closing, i t  should be noted that this brief discussion has looked a t  only one aspect 
of the computer for providing negotiation support to  promote mutual learning through 
flexible or interactive modeling. Many other promising opportunities exist, for example, 
in group modeling and gaming exercises which permit mutual generation and exploration 
of scenarios. Also, more game theoretic and decision analytic programs have been 
developed to help the group or facilitator explore outcomes in terms of the preferences 
and values of the negotiating partners. The use of the computer for aiding negotiations is 
an exciting new direction, but a direction which can benefit from a better understanding 
of the human, organizational, and political setting which ultimately determines the 
effectiveness of the computer as a negotiating tool. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The signing ministers of the Danube Declaration have emphasized that a balanced 
management of the Danube river can be achieved only through cooperation among the 
eight riparian countries. Establishing effective cooperation on improving the water qual- 
ity of the Danube, which has been been the focus of this paper, will be severely hampered 
by the power asymmetry between the upstream and downstream countries, the 
scientifically complex and ill-defined nature of the problem, the lack of an effective river 
basin regime for multilateral, integrated decision making on the Danube, and the slow 
and uneven emergence of public concern in the riparian countries. 
Sovereign nations with upstream advantages will be reluctant to negotiate water 
quality improvements unless compensating benefits are an implicit or explicit part of the 
bargain. Harmonizing parameters and definitions of water quality, as a first step in its 
cont,rol, will be complicated by the scientific gaps in understanding the effects of water 
pollutants, especially toxic substances and their dispersion, as well as the divergent 
national perceptions of the issue and resulting differences in definitions. Finally, the prm 
cess, itself, superimposes another level of complexity. In the absence of any present or 
perspective inter-basin river authority to deal with water pollution, progress will be made 
only through a series of mostly bilateral agreements covering small, "bounded" segments 
of the problem, as illustrated by the recent bilateral agreement between Austria and 
Czechoslovakia on water quality parameters and testing protocols. 
T o  the extent that  Danube water pollution becomes a more visible public issue as a 
result of (1) an increased public awareness and concern over toxic pollutants, especially 
accidental releases, or (2) becoming enmeshed in the current controversies over Danube 
development projects, the process will need to accommodate the interests and views of 
environmental groups. This will dislodge the issue from the routine, administrative 
machinery of regulatory politics and place it in the broader, and more contentious, con- 
text of environmental and ecological preservation. As the issue changes form, new pro- 
cedural mechanisms and different types of analytical expertise will be called upon in the 
process of negotiating cooperative policies. 
The dynamics of the issue underscores the need for different types of analytical sup- 
port depending on its form. As a low-key, regulatory issue and with an a ptiori  agree- 
ment on definition, negotiation forums could be usefully served with narrowly defined sup- 
port systems which facilitate mutual learning and problem solving. If the issue broadens 
both in terms of the problem and the stakeholders, then the concept of "mutual learning" 
becomes problematic. To  be useful, negotiation support systems will have to accommo- 
date plural problem definitions and rationalities which may be inconsistent with the 
rationality and logic of the system designer. The focus of multiparty negotiation support 
in an adversarial setting will, therefore, have to reorient from systems emphasizing shared 
information and analysis to systems which promote communication and mutual problem 
formulation. 
As a final word, the importance of examining international mechanisms which have 
cvolvcd for managing and negotiating wotcr issucs cannot bc ovcrcmphoeizcd. To dotc, 
nearly all forms of international cooperation with respect to shared resources have been in 
connection with surface water and aquatic resources. How problems and disputes over 
the shared uses of water resources have been negotiated and resolved, how past and 
present institutions have succeeded or failed, and the ways in which the analyst can con- 
tribute to the substantive and ~rocedural  issues, are questions of increasing concern if the 
world community is t o  cope with the expanding menu of transfrontier environmental 
problems. 
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